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INTRODUCTION 
Commercial enterprises in several industries are increasingly using 
aggressive marketing strategies to attract and keep customers.  Amongst these 
strategies, the choice of the “right” brand is obviously key.  Brands are indeed 
the main tool used by companies to comunicate to their current and potential 
customers.  As they are continuously shown on TVs, streets, billboards, and at 
social, cultural and sporting events, trademarks are often compulsory viewing 
and constitute a permanent image that viewers cannot avoid.1 
Brands are also sometimes chosen that aim at shocking existing and 
potential customers, especially youngsters.  Not rarely, companies adopt 
debatable trademarks for “shock value” in order to win consumers’ attention 
and eventually increase their market share.2  In other terms, enterprises may be 
attracted by the commercial success they can gain from edgy and controversial 
brands or borderline trademarks, which make the latter more memorable, more 
discussed, and accordingly more appealing and valuable to consumers.3  In 
short, in some circumstances, being rude or immoral may be commercially 
viable.4 
Yet, attempts at registering controversial trademarks are likely to encounter 
legislative obstacles.  Indeed, several international, regional, and national 
legislations prohibit the registration of a variety of debatable signs.  
Terminology varies depending on the jurisdiction.  The European Union (EU) 
Trademark Directive5 and Regulation,6 as well as the United Kingdom (U.K.) 
Trade Mark Act,7 ban the registration of trademarks that are “contrary to public 
policy or to accepted principles of morality.”  Similar language had been 
 
1. See generally Anne-Marie Cropley, The Registration of Scandalous Trade Marks, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY FORUM 20 (2008); Patricia Loughlan, Oh Yuck! The Registration of 
Scandalous Trade Marks, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY FORUM 38 (2006). 
2. See generally Rosalyn Gladwin, Bullshit, I Can’t Believe that was Registered, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY FORUM 38 (2006). 
3. Cropley, supra note 1, at 20; Amanda Scardamaglia, Are you Nuckin Futs? Registering 
“Scandalous” Trade Marks in Australia, 34 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 628, 629 (2012); Loughlan, 
supra note 1, at 38 (stressing that the very edginess of a trademark and its capacity to offend certain 
sections of the population may enhance its attractiveness to others and its effectiveness as a marketing 
tool). 
4. Gordon Humphreys, Freedom of speech and trademarks: Gauging public sensitivities or 
curtailing civil liberties? (2009), available at http://fordhamipconference.com/wp-content/uploads/
2010/08/Gordon_Humphreys_Freedom_of_Speech_and_Trademarks.pdf (last visited July 5, 2014); 
see generally Gordon Humphreys, Deceit and immorality in trade mark matters: does it pay to be bad? 
2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 89 (2007). 
5. Directive 2008/95/EC Approximate the Laws of the Member States Relating to Trade Marks, 
Eur. Parliament & Council [2008] O.J. (L 299/25) § (3)(1)(f).  
6. Regulation 207/2009, Cmty. Trade Mark, Eur. Union Council [2009] O.J. (L 78/1) § 7(1)(f).  
7. Trade Marks Act, 1994, c. 26, § 3(3)(a) (U.K.).   
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adopted by the Paris Convention, which prohibits the registration of signs 
“contrary to morality or public order.”8  The United States (U.S.) Lanham Act 
provides that no trademark shall be refused registration unless it consists of or 
comprises immoral, scandalous, or disparaging matter.9  An analogous 
provision is contained in the Australian Trade Marks Act according to which a 
trade mark will not be registered if it “contains or consists of scandalous 
matter.”10 
Thus, in many jurisdictions, registration cannot be offered to signs that 
contravene the state of law or are perceived as morally unacceptable.11  As U.S. 
Judge Lenroot stressed in the old case Riverbank Canning, “[t]he field is almost 
limitless from which to select words for use as trade-marks, and one who uses 
debatable marks does so at the peril that his mark may not be entitled to 
registration.”12 
A Look at Some Cases 
In the following pages, I will briefly analyse several decisions concerning 
refusal of registration on morality and public policy grounds.  I will mostly (but 
not exclusively) refer to decisions that have denied registration or confirmed 
unregistrability on said grounds.  Such signs have been refused registration 
because they conveyed messages  that governments deem unacceptable and 
therefore do not want to encourage; for example, sexually explicit messages, 
coarse language, incitement to violence, and other unlawful behaviours 
including consumption of illegal drugs, support of authoritarian political 
regimes or terroristic organizations, as well as messages that offended religious 
beliefs or disparaged ethnic and other minorities. 
United Kingdom 
In 2011, the sign “Tiny Penis” was refused registration because it was 
considered contrary to current principles of morality (the products were articles 
of clothing).  The “Appointed Person”13 held that a distinction should be drawn 
 
8. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, Art. 6quinquies(B)(3) 
(1979). 
9. Trademark Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1052 (2006)) (U.S.). 
10. Trade Marks Act 1995, § 42(a), (b) (Austl.). 
11. Absolute grounds for refusal and community collective marks, THE MANUAL CONCERNING 
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE OFFICE FOR HARMONIZATION IN THE INTERNAL MARKET (TRADE MARKS 
AND DESIGNS) 13 (Part B 2012), available at https://oami.europa.eu/tunnel-web/secure/
webdav/guest/document_library/contentPdfs/law_and_practice/trade_marks_practice_manual/part%
20_b_section_4_ag_manual_after_gl_en.pdf (last visited June 20, 2014).   
12. In re Riverbank Canning Co., 95 F.2d 327, 329 (C.C.P.A. 1938). 
13. Trade Marks Act 1994, c. 26, § 76 (U.K.). Appointed Persons hear ex parte and inter partes 
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between offence that amounts only to distaste and offence that would justifiably 
provoke outrage or would be the subject of justifiable censure as being likely 
to undermine current religious, family, or social values.14  Similarly, the sign 
“Fook” was refused registration in 2005 because it has, at least in oral use, the 
same ability to cause offence and outrage as the word “Fuck,” which is a swear 
word and deeply offensive and insulting to many people and therefore capable 
to undermine current religious, family, or social values.15  On the contrary, the 
sign “FCUK”—the acronym for the U.K. clothing company French 
Connection—was granted registration, and the registration was confirmed.  
Although it is arguable that the word in question is capable of being seen as a 
swear word, on the other hand it does not always evoke such a word in 
consumers’ minds.  It was also noted that the reason why a different conclusion 
was reached in the case regarding the sign “Fook” was that such word is 
phonetically identical to “Fuck”—and the same is not true of the sign 
“FCUK.”16 
Registration has also been denied to signs that encourage violence, 
especially in the context of sporting events such as football matches. For 
instance, the sign “standupifyouhatemanu.com” was refused registration in 
connection with a range of products including polo shirts, baseball caps, and 
scarves because such combination of words is capable of leading to criminal or 
other offensive behaviour.  Indeed, the connection between football and violent 
behaviour of some fans is well known and, according to the Registrar, the 
trademark in question conveyed a clearly violent message; for example, an 
invitation to people, in particular—football fans, to actively express their hatred 
of a football team (in this case Manchester United).17  Similarly, the sign “Inter 
City Firm,” in connection with clothing and footware, was refused registration 
since the sign was the name chosen by a well-known English football hooligan 
group mainly active in the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s, and it was associated 
with the football team West Ham United.  As noted by the Registrar, a Chelsea 
football fan seeing a West Ham fan wearing a shirt bearing the sign in question 
could easily be provoked into violence.18  This trademark, it was therefore held, 
 
appeals from decisions by the Registrar of Trade Marks Hearing Officers. Id. 
14. U.K. Trademark Application Serial No. 2232411 (filed May 13, 2000); application denied, 
p. 2 (Jan. 9, 2001).   
15. U.K. Trademark Application Serial No. 2309350 (filed Aug. 30, 2002); application denied, 
Dec. 0-133-04, paras. 13-14, 20 (May 13, 2004).  
16. French Connection Ltd., No. 2184549 v. Woodman, No. 81862, Dec. 0-137-06, para. 83 
(May 17, 2006) (U.K.).  
17. CDW Graphic Design Ltd. Application No 2227520 v. Manchester United Merch. Ltd. No. 
51354, paras. 22, 27, 33, 37 (Nov. 20, 2002) (U.K.).  
18. U.K. Trademark Application Serial No. 2376955 (filed Oct. 29, 2004); application denied, 
Dec. 0-302-05, paras. 12, 14 (Nov. 11, 2005).   
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constitutes a form of anti-social branding and is likely to cause alarm or distress.  
These two decisions are consistent with the U.K. Registrar Work Manual that 
recommend that signs which encourage or promote criminal activities should 
not be registered.19 
Signs which offend religions have also been denied registration.  For 
example, the mark “Jesus,” in connection with clothing products, has been 
considered to cause greater offence to a large sector of the public than mere 
distaste, and therefore it has been denied registration.  The very idea that the 
word “Jesus” should be appropriated for commercial purposes, as stressed by 
the Appointed Person, is anathema to believers as well as to people who believe 
in the need to respect the religious sensibilities of others.20 
European Union 
Several community trademarks have also been refused registrations on 
grounds of public policy or morality. For example, the application for the sign 
“Screw You” was rejected in connection with several ordinary items such as 
clothing, footware, and sunglasses. Yet, the registration was granted in relation 
to certain products sold in sex shops.21 This does not come as a surprise. Indeed, 
sex shops’ clients are unlikely to be shocked by that trademark. Another case 
concerned the application for the words “Fucking Freezing.” The applicant 
tried to convince the examiner that the term “fucking” used together with an 
adjective is, nowadays, considered a synonym of “very” or “particularly.” The 
Board of Appeals of the Office of Harmonization for the Internal Market 
(OHIM) did not accept that argument and considered that the sign had, in fact, 
a vulgar and offensive meaning.22  Similarly, the sign “Hijoputa,” which in 
Spanish means “son of a whore,” was denied registration, and the refusal was 
confirmed by the General Court because of the insulting message conveyed by 
such expression.23  Conversely, the sign “Dick & Funny” was registrable as it 
“does not proclaim an opinion, it contains no incitement, and conveys no 
insult.”24 
The sign “Paki,” filed by a logistics company, was considered racially 
 
19. REGISTRAR’S WORK MANUAL, c. 6, para. 9.1.  
20. U.K. International Trademark Application Serial Nos. 689374 & 776058; applications 
denied, Dec. 0-021-05, paras. 15-20 (Jan. 18, 2005).  
21. Kenneth v. J.A. Kemp & Co., [2006] OHIM R 495/2005-G, paras. 26-29 (appeal taken from 
Eng.). 
22. Entscheidung, [2011] HARMONISIERUNGSAMT FÜR DEN BINNENMARKT, OHIM R 
0168/201-1 (appeal taken from Ger.).   
23. López v. OHIM [2012] S.T.G., Dec. T-417/10, No. 207/2009, para. 23 (Spain). 
24. U.K. Trademark Application Serial No. 1 535 947 (filed Mar. 2, 2000); application denied 
(Nov. 28, 2001); rev’d, Dec. R 111/2002-4 (Mar. 25, 2003) (U.K.).   
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offensive and thus unregistrable.  This term is used in English-speaking 
countries to insult people from Pakistan or, in general, the Indian subcontinent. 
In this decision, the General Court clarified that there is no need to bring 
evidence that the applicant wants to shock or offend consumers; the objective 
fact that the sign might be perceived as a shock or an offense is enough to deny 
registration.25 
Trademarks that remind consumers of terrorist organizations or 
authoritarian regimes have also been refused registration.  The sign “Bin 
Ladin”—applied for by an import/export company whose sole shareholder was 
named Bin Ladin—is amongst those signs.  The applicant’s argument that the 
application was filed four months prior to the 9/11 attacks and therefore was 
not meant to recall the founder of al-Qaeda was dismissed by the OHIM Board 
of Appeal.  Indeed, the famous Islamist terrorist was known to the public before 
the September 2001 attacks.26  The figurative sign consisting of a representation 
of the coat of arms of the former Soviet Union, which included the hammer and 
sickle (a well-known communist symbol), was also refused registration.  The 
General Court confirmed that such mark would be perceived by a substantial 
section of the relevant public in Hungary and other former communist countries 
(which have banned that sign and similar ones as they are associated to the 
despotic regimes that ruled them in the past) as being contrary to public 
policy.27 
 
25. PAKI Logistics GmbH v. OHIM [2011] Dec. T-526/09 (Fr.); see also Birgit Clark, General 
Court refuses ‘racist’ PAKI trade mark,  7 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 392, 392–94 (2012). 
26. Switz. Trademark Application Serial No. 2 223 907 (filed Sept. 29, 2004) (Switz) (stating 
that the al-Qaeda leader was known as the orchestrator of the U.S. embassy bombings in Nairobi and 
Tanzania in 1998, which triggered the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1267 of Oct. 15, 
1999).  Similar decisions have also been taken in the United States.  See, e.g., U.S. Trademark 
Application Serial No. 77/086,418 (Feb. 6, 2007) (U.S.) (rejecting the application “OBAMA BIN 
LADEN” because, amongst other things, it referred to a terrorist and associated him with a U.S. 
presidential candidate); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78/400,213 (filed Feb. 23, 2005) (U.S.) 
(rejecting “BABY AL-QAEDA”); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78/444,968 (filed Nov. 22, 
2004) (U.S.) (refusing registration of “AL-QAEDA” because the sign refers to an organization that 
undertakes the bombing of civilians and other terrorist activities that are contrary to the sense of 
decency). 
27. Couture Tech. Ltd. v. OHIM, [2011] Gen. Ct. T-232/10. Similarly, the Hungarian 
Trademark Office refused registration of the sign “Stalinskaya,” as this word derives from the name 
of the well-known communist dictator Stalin. See Gabriella Sasvary, Hungary: Trade and Service 
Marks – Use of Name “Stalin” - Whether Contrary to Public Morality, 15 ENTM’T L. REV. PAGE, 
47–48 (2004). Analogous decision was taken by the Japanese Trademark Office with reference to the 
sign “Hitler” in connection with pinball machines.  This sign was refused registration on the basis of 
Japanese trademark legislation banning registration of signs contrary to morals and public order. See 
Jeremy Phillips & Ilanah Simon, No Marks for Hitler: A radical Reappraisal of Trade Mark Use and 
Political Sensitivity, 26 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV., 327, 327–30 (2004); Caspar P.L. van Woensel, 
Fuhrer Wines at your Local Store: Legal Means against Commercial Exploitation of Intolerable 
Portrayals, 27 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV., 37, 37–42 (2005). 
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United States 
In the U.S., the trademark “Redskins,” registered by the famous American 
football team, has been challenged by some Native American petitioners.  The 
Board of the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) first 
cancelled the registration on the grounds that it might disparage Native 
Americans and may bring them into contempt or disrepute, but denied the 
petitioners’ allegation that the sign was scandalous.28  The Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia Circuit then found that the disparagement and 
contempt claims were barred by laches.29  In a subsequent proceeding related 
to the same sign, the USPTO Board held again that the Redskins trademark is 
disparaging and cancelled six registrations.30 
A line of cases also regarded sexual messages. In McGinley, the sign 
included “a photograph of a nude man and woman kissing and embracing in a 
manner appearing to expose the male genitalia”31 (the product was a newsletter 
dealing with sexual topics).  The mark was considered offensive to propriety, 
morality, and decency, and it was  shocking to the moral sense of the members 
of the community.32  An opposite conclusion was reached in both Old Glory 
Condom and Mavety.  In the former case, the sign was “a pictorial 
representation of a condom decorated with stars and stripes in a manner to 
suggest the American flag.”33  The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board rejected 
the Examiner’s argument that a majority of people would be scandalized and 
offended by the juxtaposition of the American flag and goods related to sexual 
activity.  It is believed that the Board’s decision was influenced by its approval 
of the message that the applicant was meant to convey; for example, that it is 
Americans’ patriotic duty to fight AIDS by practicing safe sex.34  In Mavety, 
the publisher of an adult magazine, featuring naked African-American women, 
was allowed to register the title “Black Tail.”  The sign was not barred under 
the immoral or scandalous prohibition as the public would mainly believe that 
the term “tail” refers to buttocks and not to a female sex object.35 
 
28. Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1705 (T.T.A.B. 1999), rev’d, 284 F. Supp. 2d 96, 
68 U.S.P.Q.2d 1225 (D.D.C. 2003), remanded to 415 F.3d 44, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d 1525 (D.C. Cir. 2005).  
29. Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 565 F.3d 880, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d 1593 (D.C. Cir. 2009), cert. 
denied, 130 S. Ct. 631 (2009). 
30. Blackhorse, Briggs-Cloud, Gover, Lone-Bentley, Pappan, & Tsotigh v. Pro-Football, Inc., 
111 U.S.P.Q.2d 1080 (T.T.A.B. 2014).  
31. In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 482 (C.C.P.A. 1981). 
32. McGinley, 660 F.2d at 482. 
33. In re Old Glory Condom Corp., 26 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1216 (T.T.A.B. 1993). 
34. Id. at 1221. 
35. In re Mavety Media Group, 33 F.3d 1367, 1369, 1373, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d 1923 (Fed. Cir. 1994) 
(stating that the case was vacated and remanded to deduce if the Board could support its reasoning for 
believing the mark was immoral or scandalous). 
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Australia 
The sign “Kunt” was refused registration in relation to clothing.  The 
Australian Registrar refused the applicant’s argument that the term has become 
not offensive under the present social mores.  It was indeed held that: 
[N]either is it necessary that all people might find the word obscene. It is 
enough  . . . that a substantial number of people are likely to find the word 
shocking–but this number need not be as much or greater than 50%. . . . [I]t is 
sufficient if the result of the user of the trade mark will be that a not 
insubstantial number of people will be, or are likely to be, shocked.36 
Conversely, the expression “Nuckin Futs,” in connection with prepared 
nuts, mixtures of nuts, and dried fruits, was considered acceptable, despite the 
fact that it is a clear spoonerism for “fucking nuts.”  The registration is, 
however, conditional upon the trademark not being used on goods marketed to 
children.37 Such condition should not jeopardise the owner of the registration 
since the products are sold in pubs that kids cannot enter. 
A very recent case regards an application by a Malaysian company for the 
sign “MH17,” which was filed in July 2014 on the day after the Malaysian 
Airlines flight MH17 crashed into fields in eastern Ukraine, killing all 298 
passengers aboard (it was probably hit by a missile launched by pro-Russian 
rebels).38  It will be interesting to know the outcome of the application.  It seems 
probable that such a distateful attempt to capitalise on a tragedy that has 
attracted worldwide media coverage will be rejected by the Australian 
Trademark Office. 
The Right and Duty of Public Authorities to Have a Say 
One may argue that trademark offices and judges should not be bothered 
with assessing whether a sign is immoral, scandalous, offensive, or against 
public policy. Market forces alone—the argument goes—would be able to 
address such issues because, if the sign is really controversial, consumers would 
feel offended and refuse to buy the relevant products or services, which will 
eventually push the brand out of the market.39 
I believe such argument is flawed.  Indeed, many members of the public 
could be attracted to buying the relevant product or service exactly because of 
 
36. In re Kuntstreetwear Pty Ltd. Trade Mark Application [2007] 73 IPR 438.  
37. Austl. Trademark Application Serial No. 14082134 (filed Mar. 3, 2011) (Austl.) in the name 
of Universal Trading Australia Pty Ltd as trustee for Basil and Groovy Trust.  
38. See Company’s bid for MH17 trademark, THE AUSTRALIAN (July 24, 2014, 5:54 PM), 
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/latest-news/companys-bid-for-mh17-trademark/story-
fn3dxiwe-1227000391660. 
39. Jasmine Abdel-Khalik, To Live in In-’Fame’-Y: Reconceiving Scandalous Marks as 
Analogous to Famous Marks, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 173, 176 (2007). 
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the debatable message conveyed by the brand.  As has been held in the U.S. 
case regarding the (refusal of) registration of the sign “DICK HEADS,” coupled 
with a clear representation of male genitalia (in connection with restaurant and 
bar services), “some people may well buy applicant’s promotional items 
because of the scandalous nature of the mark, for ‘shock’ value, but this does 
not mean that the mark, in the context in which it is used, is not offensive to a 
substantial composite of the general public.”40  In other words, the fact that a 
brand is offensive may be seen by some consumers as a positive aspect of the 
whole commercial offer and constitute a driver of purchasing behaviours.  Yet, 
this does not make the message conveyed by the trademark morally acceptable. 
That is why there is a need for governments to intervene.  Attempts by 
commercial enterprises to go beyond the line of what is decent and win 
consumers’ attention by relying on morally unacceptable brands41 (which can 
inflict emotional distress on a substantial portion of people) should be 
neutralised.42  It is public authorities, namely trademark examiners and judges, 
that have the right and duty to prevent such attempts and protect decency, 
welfare, and morals—and they accomplish such a duty by denying or cancelling 
the registration of these controversial signs.43  On the contrary, trademarks that 
convey neutral and inoffensive messages, or even positive messages (e.g. Old 
Glory Condom case above), do not constitute a threat to morality and thus 
should not be denied protection. 
Moreover, it has been argued that public authorities should not waste their 
precious time and resources by dealing with the signs in question.44  This has 
also been affirmed in both the U.S. and EU decisions. For example, in 
McGinley, it was held that scandalous trademarks should not “occupy the time, 
services, and use of funds of the federal government.”45  In the EU case 
concerning the sign “Screw You,” it was held that: 
[T]he rationale of the provision is that the privileges of trade mark 
registration should not be granted in favour of signs that are contrary to public 
policy or the accepted principles of morality. In other words, the organs of 
government and public administration should not positively assist people who 
wish to further their business aims by means of trade marks that offend against 
 
40. In re Wilcher Corp., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1929, 1934 (T.T.A.B. 1996). 
41. Cropley, supra note 1, at 20; Gladwin, supra note 2, at 38. 
42. Anne Gilson LaLonde & Jerome Gilson, Trademarks Laid Bare: Marks that May Be 
Scandalous or Immoral, 101 TRADEMARK REP. 1476, 1485 (2011).  
43. Stephen R. Baird, Moral Intervention in the Trademark Arena: Banning the Registration of 
Scandalous and Immoral Trademarks, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 661, 675–76 (1993). 
44. Id. at 788.  
45. McGinley, 660 F.2d at 486, 211 U.S.P.Q. 668.  See also Jeffrey Lefstin, Does the First 
Amendment Bar Cancellation of REDSKINS?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 665, 683 (2000). 
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certain basic values of civilised society.46 
A category of consumers and people that particularly need to be protected 
from controversial brands are children, even when they are not the intended 
consumers of the relevant goods and products.  The OHIM Manual of 
Trademark Practice expressly refers to them.  There is an interest, the Manual 
stresses, in ensuring that children and young people, even if they do not 
constitute the public of the goods and services in question, do not encounter 
offensive words in shops that are accessible to the general public.47  In the 
OHIM’s decision regarding the sign “Screw You,” it was interestingly held 
that: 
It is also necessary to bear in mind that, while broad-minded adults may 
enjoy bawdy humour in a particular context, they might not wish to be exposed 
to material with explicit sexual content when walking down the street or 
watching television in the company of their children . . . . [A] substantial 
proportion of ordinary citizens in Britain and Ireland whose values and 
standards are representative of society as a whole would find the words 
SCREW YOU offensive and objectionable, especially if they encountered them 
as a trade mark in ordinary shops to which children have access, or if they were 
advertised on television at a time when children were likely to be watching or 
if they were displayed prominently on clothing worn in the street or visibile in 
shop windows.48 
The Australian decision involving the sign “Nuckin Futs” is also relevant.  
As we have seen in that case, registration was granted on the condition that the 
underlying products are not marketed to children.49 
 
46. Kenneth v. J.A. Kemp & Co., [2006] OHIM R 495/2005-G, para. 13 (appeal taken from 
Eng.). The concept of “privilege of trade mark registration” is also mentioned in the OHIM’s decision 
concerning the coarse words “Fucking Freezing.”  It is the responsibility of OHIM—confirmed by the 
First Board of Appeal in that case—to ensure that the privileges of trade mark registration are not 
extended to trade marks which are deeply offensive, vulgar, disgusting or potentially capable of 
causing outrage.”  See Entscheidung, [2011] HARMONISIERUNGSAMT FÜR DEN BINNENMARKT, 
OHIM R 0168/201-1 (appeal taken from Ger.).   
47. Absolute grounds for refusal and community collective marks, THE MANUAL CONCERNING 
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE OFFICE FOR HARMONIZATION IN THE INTERNAL MARKET (TRADE MARKS 
AND DESIGNS) 15 (Part B 2012), available at https://oami.europa.eu/tunnel-web/secure
/webdav/guest/document_library/contentPdfs/law_and_practice/trade_marks_practice_manual/part%
20_b_section_4_ag_manual_after_gl_en.pdf (last visited June 20, 2014).   
48. Kenneth v. J.A. Kemp & Co., [2006] OHIM R 495/2005-G, paras. 21, 26 (appeal taken 
from Eng.); see also Entscheidung, [2011] HARMONISIERUNGSAMT FÜR DEN BINNENMARKT, OHIM 
R 0168/201-1, para. 25 (appeal taken from Ger.). The need to protect family values has also been 
stressed in the decisions concerning the U.K. trademarks “Tiny Penis,” U.K. Trademark Application 
Serial No. 2232411 (filed May 13, 2000); application denied (Jan. 9, 2001), and “Fook,” U.K. 
Trademark Application Serial No. 2309350 (filed Aug. 30, 2002); application denied, Dec. 0-133-04, 
para. 12 (May 13, 2004). 
49.  See supra note 35. Austl. Trademark Application No. 14082134 in the name of Universal 
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THE “PARADOX” AND THE “LACK OF INCENTIVE” 
The opponents of the provisions that ban the registration of controversial 
trademarks often highlight a paradox stemming from such rules, namely the 
fact that even if the registration is denied, the applicant can still use the sign in 
the course of trade.  The refusal of registration, the argument goes, does not 
prohibit use of the immoral sign by the applicant and would therefore be 
useless.  Actually, as any trader would be free to adopt the trademark in 
question, the denial of registration could even increase its use, which would be 
exactly the opposite of what the rules in question aim to accomplish.50 
Several decisions have referred or hinted to this paradox. In the case 
concerning the U.K. trademark application for “Tiny Penis,” the Appointed 
Person held that “the system of registration of trademarks is to protect both 
traders and the public . . . [and the refusal of registration] does not prevent a 
trader using a mark but merely denies him the protection of registration.”51  And 
in the decision concerning the U.K. trademark “FCUK,” it was noted that 
“withholding protection is, at least in principle, more likely to result in that 
subject matter being widely disseminated than if protection were conferred.”52 
This paradox-focused argument, I believe, is not convincing.  There is 
indeed no doubt that a trademark registration constitutes an incentive to make 
investments in a certain sign.  The owner of a trademark that has been refused 
registration or whose registration has been cancelled may not have economic 
incentive to continue to use the brand.  If exclusive rights are lost, it would 
make no sense economically to keep using the sign.53  Thus, the refusal or 
cancellation of registration on grounds of public policy and morality greatly 
decreases the value of the trademark (e.g., the use of the ® symbol next to the 
brand would be prohibited) such that the owner would likely choose not to use 
it anymore.54  Seen from this perspective, the ban on registrability can be an 
appropriate tool for states to discourage the use of debatable signs55 and, 
 
Trading Australia Pty Ltd as trustee for Basil and Groovy Trust.  
50. Phillips & Simon, supra note 27, at 328.   
51. U.K. Trademark Application Serial No. 2232411 (filed May 13, 2000); application denied 
(Jan. 9, 2001) (U.K.). See also López v. OHIM [2012] S.T.G., Dec. T-417/10, No. 207/2009, para. 26 
(Spain).(regarding the word “Hijoputa”). 
52. French Connection Ltd., No. 2184549 v. Woodman, No. 81862, Dec. 0-137-06, para. 54 
(May 17, 2006) (U.K.). 
53. Baird, supra note 43, at 673 n. 39.   
54. Paul E. Loving, Native American Team Names in Athletics: It’s Time to Trade These Marks, 
13 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 1, 2 (1992).  
55. See Abdel-Khalik, supra note 39, at 213.  
The obvious justification for prohibiting registration of scandalous marks is to regulate 
morality and, specifically, to guide potential trademark owners away from “improper” 
trademarks. In 1909, for example, the Commissioner of Patents indicated that the role of the 
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therefore, preserve morality and welfare.56 
CHANGES IN MORAL STANDARDS 
Moral standards change over time and space.  What was considered morally 
unacceptable fifty years ago might be considered acceptable nowadays, due to 
changes in social attitudes.  Also, what is deemed morally admissible in a 
country could be considered outrageous in another, given the cultural and social 
differences between nations and people.  Trademarks are no exception, and the 
period and place where the perception of a brand by the relevant public is 
measured becomes relevant.57  Therefore, it does not come as a surprise that 
trademark offices and judges may make different decisions in similar cases.  
For example, the word “Jesus” has been refused registration in the U.K.,58 
whereas in Australia, signs containing the same word have been recently 
registered.59  While the sign “Madonna” was considered scandalous in 
connection with bottles of wine in the U.S. in 1938,60 the same trademark has 
been lawfully registered decades later by the famous pop music star,61 whose 
use of Christian symbols in erotic contexts may be considered much more 
scandalous than in relation to wine.  Also, the signs “Mecca” and “Hallelujah” 
have been rejected in the past,62 but later have been registered.63 
 
Patent Office included discouraging the use of marks that detract from “the dignity of the 
high office which [Presidents] have held.” 
56. Baird, supra note 43, at 788; Ron Phillips, A Case for Scandal and Immorality: Proposing 
Thin Protection of Controversial Trademarks, 17 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 55, 67 (2008); Bruce 
C. Kelber, “Scalping the Redskins:” Can Trademark Law Start Athletic Teams Bearing Native 
American Nicknames And Images On The Road To Racial Reform?, 17 HAMLINE L. REV. 533, 555–
56 (1994); Kimberly A. Pace, The Washington Redskins Case and The Doctrine of Disparagement: 
How Politically Correct Must a Trademark Be?, 22 PEPP. L. REV. 7, 37 (1994). 
57. It is widely accepted that the conformity of a trademark with morality must be judged at the 
date of its application.  See HALLELUJAH Trade Mark Application [1976] 22 R.P.C. 605, 607 (U.K.) 
(concerning the refusal of an application to register the sign “Hallelujah” for clothing).  In this decision, 
the hearing officer held that “it is well established that the registrability of a trade mark must be judged 
as at the date of its application. I conclude that the phrase ‘contrary to morality’ falls to be considered 
by the generally accepted standards of today and not by those of 1938.”  Id. 
58. U.K. International Trademark Application Serial Nos. 689374 & 776058; applications 
denied, Dec. 0-021-05, para. 27 (Jan. 18, 2005). 
59. See, e.g., EPIC JESUS, Registration No. 1028403 (Austl. 2006); J.A.M. JESUS AND ME, 
Registration No. 943758 (Austl. 2003); HANGING OUT WITH JESUS, Registration No. 742126 (Austl. 
1997). 
60. Riverbank Canning Co., 95 F.2d at 329. 
61. MADONNA, Registration No. 1,463,601 (U.S.) (for clothing); MADONNA, Registration No. 
1,473,554 (U.S.) (for entertainment services).   
62. See generally HALLELUJAH Trade Mark Application [1976] 22 R.P.C. 605 (U.K.); 
MERCY’S Trade Mark Application [1955] 25 A.O.J.P. 938 (Austl.). 
63. HAIR MECCA, Registration No. 1392748 (Austl.); HALLELUJAH CLOTHING, Registration 
No. 1200316 (Austl.).  
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In the already mentioned U.S. case Old Glory Condom, the USPTO 
Trademark Trial and Appeals Board noted that “what was considered 
scandalous as a trademark or service mark twenty, thirty, or fifty years ago may 
no longer be considered so, given the changes in societal attitudes.  Marks once 
thought scandalous may now be thought merely humurous (or even quaint).”64  
Similarly, in Mavety, the U.S. Court warned to be “mindful of ever-changing 
social attitudes and sensitivities.  Today’s scandal can be tomorrow’s vogue.”65 
Changes in moral attitudes may also happen the other way around. Words 
or expressions which were considered acceptable decades ago may not be 
considered admissible nowadays.  Some racist names or adjectives such as 
“colored” and “yellow” had sometimes been used in the past to refer to black 
or Asian people, but in the present day they are considered as having racist 
connotations.66  For instance, trademarks such as “Nigger Head Brand” for 
canned vegetables and “Niggerhair Tobacco” accompanied by a caricature of a 
black woman with a bushy Afro and rings through her nose67 had been used in 
the U.S. in the past.  It has been noted that while such trademarks could have 
been acceptable in the first part of the twentieth century, “an era politically and 
economically dominated by white men,” they cannot be accepted in the current 
multi-cultural society.68  That is also why some companies have tried to adapt, 
over the decades, certain debatable trademarks, mostly to avoid offending or 
alienating large categories of customers.69 
I believe that trademarks which have, over the years, become morally 
unacceptable should be kept out of the register.  They should be refused 
registration if they are scandalous or contrary to accepted principles of morality 
at the time of filing, and if already registered, they should be revoked. 
 
64.  Old Glory Condom Corp., 26 U.S.P.Q. 2d at 1219. 
65.  Mavety Media Group, 33 F.3d at 1371. 
66. Regan Smith, Trademark Law and Free Speech: Protection for Scandalous and 
Disparaging Marks, 42 HAR. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 451, 480–81 (2007). 
67. Nancy Kruh, Collecting Controversy - Evolving Images: Aunt Jemina, Uncle Ben and The 
Chef of Cream of Wheat, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 13, 1994, at 1F, available at 
http://infoweb.newsbank.com/iw-search/we/InfoWeb?p_product=NewsBank&p_theme=aggregated5
&p_action=doc&p_docid=0ED3D43F7B1EDD78&p_docnum=1&p_queryname=2.  
68. Pace, supra note 56, at 8–9.  
69. See, e.g., id. at 8–9.  Perhaps the best example of an evolution of a brand over the years is 
the “Aunt Jemima” trademark owned by the Quaker Oats Company.  When the brand was first used in 
1893, Aunt Jemima “appeared as a caricature of a black ‘mammy’ grinning with a handkerchief over 
the head,” (indeed a caricature of slave-like servitude).  Id. at 9.  Her image conveyed messages related 
not only to family lives and secret recipes, but also to plantation life as a happy slave contributes to the 
post civil war idealism of southern life and America’s developing consumer culture.  Since then, Aunt 
Jemima has undergone several makeovers aimed at making the brand a less racially stereotyped one.  
See id. at 9–10.  
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REFUSAL OF REGISTRATION AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 
As mentioned above, there is little economic incentive in using unregistered 
signs, and refusing registration often encourages applicants to abandon the 
brand.  Can, therefore, a refusal by a trademark office to register a sign on 
morality and public policy grounds be considered as a restriction on 
commercial free speech? 
First, it should be noted that trademarks do constitute commercial 
expression, as brands definitely provide current and potential customers with 
useful information that enable them to make educated purchase choices.70  And 
such expression attracts some form of protection.  In Friedman, the U.S. 
Supreme Court held that since trade names are “used as part of a proposal of a 
commercial transaction,” their use is a form of commercial speech that deserves 
a limited measure of protection under the First Amendment.71  Commercial 
expression is also protected in Europe under Article 10 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR).72 
 
70. Jerome Gilson, TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE, § 5.09(5)(a), 5-165.  
[T]rademarks and advertising, potent forms of communication, transmit commercial images, 
thoughts, claims and facts. Their purpose is to sell: to convince would-be purchasers that this 
product is the best, that it comes from a reliable source, that its quality is unsurpassed, that 
the purchaser’s well being would undoubtedly be enhanced by a purchase.  
Id. 
71. Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 11 (1979).  See also Baird, supra note 43, at 687 (noting, 
however, that the Supreme Court’s finding cannot be interpreted as giving trademark owners 
unconditional rights to use their signs).  The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states that 
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to 
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”  U.S. CONST. amend. I 
(emphasis added).   
72. ECHR art. 10.  
Everyone has the right to freedom of expression.  This right shall include freedom to 
hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by 
public authority and regardless of frontiers.  
The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may 
be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by 
law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, 
territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the 
protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, 
for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining 
the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.  
Id. (emphasis added).  The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) held on several occasions that 
statements made in a commercial context are protected by Article 10 ECHR, and that the latter does 
not distinguish between various forms of expression.  Accordingly all expression, whatever its content 
(political, commercial, etc.) is protected as free speech.  See, e.g., Krone Verlag GmbH & Co. KG v. 
Austria, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 4, paras. 19-20 (2002); Casado Coca v. Spain, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1,  11–12, paras. 
33–37 (1994) (this case regarded restrictions on lawyers’ advertising).  The court noted that: 
[T]he impugned notices merely gave the applicant’s name, profession, address and telephone 
56 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L.  REV. [Vol. 19:1 
 
Having said that, trademark owners might argue that the government or 
other interested parties, including competitors, who raise the moral or public 
policy issue before an office or a court want to censor or silence them on the 
basis of the content of their brands.  As has been noted, refusals by governments 
to register such signs have the potential to drive particular forms of expression 
from the marketplace, so they must be scrutinised under free speech 
legislation.73 
Several courts in the U.K., EU, and U.S. have already touched on this issue.  
U.K. and EU judges and examiners, in particular, increasingly refer to Article 
10 ECHR when it comes to refusing registration of signs which are considered 
contrary to public policy and morality.  Yet, they have often concluded that no 
interference with free speech takes place since the denial of registration does 
not prevent the applicant from using the sign.74  U.S. courts have taken a similar 
approach. In McGinley, the court held that no violation of free speech stems 
from denial of registration as “no conduct is proscribed, and no tangible form 
of expression is suppressed.  Consequently, appellant’s First Amendment rights 
would not be abridged by the refusal to register his mark.”75 
Yet, one may also argue that the refusal of registration still represents an 
indirect restriction of applicant’s free speech under both Article 10 ECHR or 
the First Amendment as companies may be unwilling to invest in large-scale 
promotional and marketing campaigns for signs that are not registered,76 which 
would have chilling effects on commercial expression.77  U.S. Judge Pauline 
Newman’s dissenting opinion in Ritchie v. Simpson followed this line of 
reasoning by generally noting that “abridgement may result from a law that 
 
number.  They were clearly published with the aim of advertising, but they provided persons 
requiring legal assistance with information that was of definite use and likely to facilitate 
their access to justice.  Article 10 (art. 10) is therefore applicable. 
 Id. at 12, paras. 36–37; Markt Intern Verlag GmbH & Klaus Beermann v. Germany,  Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 
1617, paras. 37–38 (1989). 
73. Lefstin, supra note 45, at 677–79, 692 (noting in general that any commercial speech 
regulation aims at suppressing information about a product or service). 
74. See, e.g., López v. OHIM [2012] S.T.G., Dec. T-417/10, No. 207/2009, para. 26 (Spain) 
(regarding “Hijoputa”); Entscheidung, [2011] HARMONISIERUNGSAMT FÜR DEN BINNENMARKT, 
OHIM R 0168/201-1 (appeal taken from Ger.) (concerning the sign “Fucking Freezing”); Couture 
Tech. Ltd. v. OHIM, [2011] Gen. Ct. T-232/10, paras. 69–71 (appeal taken from Lux) (referencing the 
sign consisting of a representation of the coat of arms of the former Soviet Union, which included the 
hammer and sickle).  
75. See generally McGinley, 660 F.2d at 481.  See also Ritchie v. Simpson, 170 F.3d 1092, 
1099 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (stressing in dicta that the First Amendment is not implicated in denial of 
trademark registrations); In re Boulevard Entertainment, 334 F.3d 1336, 1343 (2003); Mavety Media 
Group, 33 F.3d at 1374 (citing McGinley, 660 F.2d at 481). 
76. Kenneth v. J.A. Kemp & Co., [2006] OHIM R 495/2005-G, para. 15 (appeal taken from 
Eng.) (emphasis added). 
77. Baird, supra note 43, at 686 n. 87. 
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merely burdens an exercise of speech.”78 
Even assuming an interference with the right to commercial free speech 
takes place, such interference could still be justified if certain conditions are 
met.  Under Article 10(2) ECHR, an interference would be justified if it is: (i) 
proscribed by law,79 (ii) for one of the permitted aims mentioned in the second 
part of the provision (which includes the prevention of disorder or crime as well 
as the protection of health or morals),80 and (iii) “necessary in a democratic 
society.”81  The latter requirement is particularly important.  The European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has constantly held that such a requirement 
includes three conditions, for example: interferences should address pressing 
social needs, be proportional, and be accompanied by relevant and sufficient 
reasons.82  Not very different requirements have been laid out by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation v. Public 
Service Commission.83  In order to restrict (protected) commercial free speech, 
(i) the government must establish a substantial interest in such a restriction, (ii) 
the latter must directlty advance the governmental interest in question, and (iii) 
it must be no more extensive than necessary to serve said interest (i.e. a 
proportionality rule).84 
As far as the European scenario is concerned, one may thus argue that the 
refusal to register the signs in question aims at preventing disorders and crimes 
 
78. Ritchie, 170 F.3d at 1103 (Newman, J., dissenting); Melville B. Nimmer, Nimmer on 
Freedom of Speech, 4-33 (1984).  
Abridging” within the meaning of the First Amendment may occur even if the law in 
question does not by its terms either prohibit or punish speech . . . . State action may 
nevertheless be invalid if it constitutes a “discouragement” of speech, or perhaps, if it 
eliminates a “basic incentive” to engage in speech. 
 Id.  See also Am. Commc’n Ass’n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 402 (1950) (“[I]ndirect ‘discouragements’ 
undoubtedly have the same coercive effect upon the exercise of First Amendment rights as 
imprisonment, fines, injunctions or taxes.”); Jendi B. Reiter, Redskins and Scarlet Letters: Why 
“Immoral” and “Scandalous” Trademarks Should Be Federally Registrable, 6 FED. CIR. B.J. 191, 
198 (1996). 
79. This condition would be met in case of refusal to register signs which are contrary to public 
order or morality as the principles enshrined in the provisions in question have sufficient legal certainty 
and foreseeability to qualify as “law” under the ECHR.  See Jonathan Griffiths, Is There a Right to an 
Immoral Trade Mark?, SOC. SCI. RESEARCH NETWORK 1, 3 (2009), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1492117.  
80. ECHR art. 10; Krone Verlag GmbH & Co. KG v. Austria, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 4, paras. 19–20 
(2002); Casado Coca v. Spain, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1,  11–12, paras. 33–37 (1994); Markt Intern Verlag 
GmbH & Klaus Beermann v. Germany, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 16–17, paras. 37–38 (1989). 
81. ECHR art. 10(2). 
82. This requirement would be met in the scenario in question as the refusals of registration 
under the provisions prohibiting the registration of signs contrary to public order or morality always 
include written reasons.  See, e.g., Griffiths, supra note 79, at 7. 
83. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980). 
84. Kelber, supra note 56, at 559–60.  
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(e.g. the cases concerning the signs “www.standupifyouhatemanu,” “Inter City 
Firm,” “Bin Ladin,” etc.) as well as at protecting morals (e.g. the decisions 
regarding “Jesus,”85 “Tiny Penis,” “Screw You,” “Fook,” “Fucking Freezing,” 
etc.), and that therefore the interference with commercial free speech addresses 
pressing social needs.86  As to the U.S. scenario, it has been noted that the 
federal government has several substantial interests that would justify the ban 
on registration of scandalous and disparaging trademarks,87 including to 
discourage their use by denying exclusive rights, the need not to waste financial 
resources dealing with these issues,88 and the duty to protect the health, safety, 
and welfare of the people.89  The additional requirement under Central Hudson, 
namely that the restriction directly advances the substantial interests in 
question, seems satisfied also.  This burden requires the government to show 
an “immediate connection” between the restriction and the interest pursued.90  
Again the disincentive-related argument could be used; it could be argued in 
particular that by refusing to monopolise the trademarks in question, the 
government pursues its legitimate aim to discourage their use, as well as to not 
waste time and resources with said signs, and to protect the health, safety, and 
welfare of the public.91 
Then comes the proportionality requirement.  Both Article 10(2) ECHR and 
the First Amendment as interpreted in Central Hudson and Board of Trustees 
v. Fox92 require governments that want to restrict commercial free speech to 
 
85. See generally U.K. International Trademark Application Serial Nos. 689374 & 776058; 
applications denied, Dec. 0-021-05 (Jan. 18, 2005).  Section 3(3)(a) of the U.K. Trade Mark Act “seeks 
to prohibit registration in cases where it would be legitimate for the ‘prevention of disorder’ or 
‘protection of . . . morals’ to regard use of the trade mark in question as objectionable in accordance 
with the criteria identified in Article 10 ECHR.”  Id. at para. 6.  The use of the sign Jesus “as a 
trademark should . . .  be regarded as seriously troubling in terms of the public interest in the 
‘prevention of disorder’ and ‘protection of morals’ under Article 10 ECHR.”  Id. at para. 26. 
86. French Connection Ltd., No. 2184549 v. Woodman, No. 81862, Dec. 0-137-06, para. 60 
(May 17, 2006) (U.K.) ( “[R]egistration should be refused only where this is justified by a pressing 
social need.”). 
87. Thus far, however, no court has analyzed the ban on registrability of scandalous and 
disparaging signs under the Central Hudson test. See Baird, supra note 43, at 788. 
88. Baird, supra note 43, at 788; Lefstin, supra note 43, at 683; McGinley, 660 F.2d at 486, 
211 U.S.P.Q. 668. 
89. Baird, supra note 43, at 699. 
90. Adolph Coors Co. v. Brady, 944 F.2d 1543, 1547 (10th Cir. 1991) (quoting Central Hudson, 
447 U.S. at 566). 
91. Kelber, supra note 56, at 560–61. 
92. 492 U.S. 469, 477, 480 (1989) (relaxing the proportionality principle established in Central 
Hudson). The test now no longer asks whether the governmental regulation is “no more extensive than 
reasonably necessary” to service the interest in question, but has been diluted.  Id. at 477.  A perfect 
fit between the restriction and the interest pursued is no longer required—a reasonable fit is sufficient 
instead.  Id. at 480.  
2015] BRANDS, MORALITY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 59 
 
prove that such restriction is proportional.  Trademark offices or courts must 
therefore conduct a balancing exercise with a view to finding out whether 
denying registration of a certain sign is necessary for one of the relevant 
purposes.  Some U.K. and EU decisions have mentioned the need to carry out 
this test by expressly referring to Article 10(2) ECHR.  In the case concerning 
the sign “FCUK,” for example, it was held that registration should be refused 
only where this is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.93 
A balanced approach seems to have been taken in the appeal decision, 
which confirmed the refusal to register the U.K. trademark “Fook.”  As in many 
parts of the United Kingdom, this expression is phonetically identical to the 
term Fuck.”94 Having considered the matter through the eyes of the “right-
thinking” member of the public, I have concluded that use of the word “Fook” 
as a trademark would cause greater offense than mere distaste to a significant 
section of the general public,95 and therefore, I conclude that the trademark 
applied for is contrary to public policy.  This does not come as a surprise.  It 
should be noted that, especially in Europe, public authorities benefit from 
greater freedom when it comes to restricting commercial expression as opposed 
to political speech and media speech.  The ECtHR has constantly accorded less 
weight to commercial communication than to other forms of speech, with the 
result that states enjoy a wider margin of appreciation when it comes to 
restricting such speech, including the refusal to grant monopolistic rights on a 
debatable sign (which should therefore be subject to a more relaxed scrutiny).96  
As has been interestingly noted, the mere application of a trademark to products 
or services cannot be compared to other more complex forms of communication 
such as political or artistic speeches.97  OHIM’s approach is in line with this 
interpretation.  In the decision concerning the refusal to register the sign “Screw 
You,” the Grand Board of Appeal stressed that “freedom of artistic expression 
is regarded as a higher priority than freedom of commercial expression and 
consequently it is more fiercely protected.  The use of profanities in the name 
of art and literature is circumscribed with great reluctance in democratic and 
open societies.  The same is true in relation to expressing opinions.  “A militant 
atheist may write an article for public consumption ridiculing religion, for 
 
93. French Connection Ltd., No. 2184549 v. Woodman, No. 81862, Dec. 0-137-06, para. 22 
(May 17, 2006) (U.K.). 
94. U.K. Trademark Application Serial No. 2309350 (filed Aug. 30, 2002); application denied, 
Dec. 0-133-04, para. 11 (May 13, 2004). 
95. Id. at paras. 23–24. 
96. Griffiths, supra note 79, at 11 (citing several ECtHR decisions).  Thus far the ECtHR has 
not heard any case regarding the refusal to register a trademark and its possible interference with the 
right to free speech under Article 10(2) ECHR. 
97. Griffiths, supra note. 79, at 14.  
60 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L.  REV. [Vol. 19:1 
 
example, and the State will not intervene. But a trade mark mocking, or 
exploiting the name of, the founder of a major world religion might none the 
less be kept off the register.”98 
The margin of appreciation for trademark examiners and judges who are 
tasked with examining the registrability of controversial signs is not wide just 
because commercial speech is less weighted than other forms of expression.  It 
is also wide because of the nature of the competing interests, for example: 
protection of decency, morality, and dignity, as well as compliance with public 
policy.  Indeed, the ECtHR has often accorded states a quite ample margin of 
appreciation on issues of decency and morality as well as protection of the 
religious rights of others, public security maintenance, and prevention of 
disorders.99 
CONCLUSION 
This article has made the point that economic operators do not have 
complete freedom when it comes to registering signs, and trademark offices 
and judges have the right and duty to restrict such freedom by refusing 
registration if that is necessary to protect competing interests, including: 
morality, decency, public order, and minorities’ rights.  Minors are particularly 
protected by the ban in question, as it has been confirmed in several decisions 
highlighted in this work that stress the risk of childrens’ exposure to sexually-
explicit signs (e.g. “Nuckin Futs” and “Screw You”). 
A criticism of the prohibition on the registration of immoral and scandalous 
trademarks is that the same would be useless as it does not prohibit the use of 
the (unregistered) sign in the market.  Yet, we have seen that this argument is 
not convincing as bans on registration of the brands in question are capable of 
discouraging their use by removing the legal protection which stems from the 
registration.  Indeed, few companies would invest into, and use, brands that will 
eventually not be registered.  The effect of these bans, thus, is to push applicants 
to abandon controversial signs. 
Moreover, the bans analysed in this article might be subject to change.  
Morality may indeed change over time, and signs that forty or fifty years ago 
were considered immoral or scandalous, and therefore not registrable, may 
nowadays be perceived differently and thus registrable, and viceversa.  The law 
must accommodate such changes and allow the registration of signs that are no 
 
98. Kenneth v. J.A. Kemp & Co., [2006] OHIM R 495/2005-G, para. 24 (appeal taken from 
Eng.) (emphasis added). 
99. See, e.g., Wingrove v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 18, para. 58 (1996); Otto-
Preminger-Inst. v. Austria, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 16–17, paras. 56–57 (1994); Muller v. Switzerland, Eur. 
Ct. H.R. 1, 17–18, para. 36 (1991). 
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longer considered controversial, while refusing protection of (initially 
acceptable) signs that have become morally deplorable or contra legem later 
on. 
We have also seen that trademark examiners and judges, especially in 
Europe, increasingly carry out a balancing exercise between, on the one hand, 
the right of traders to freely choose words and logos to be incorporated into a 
registered trademark (basically, a freedom of commercial expression) and, on 
the other hand, the right of the public not to come across outrageous brands.  
Should trademark offices and courts take an approach that is too strict and 
paternalistic, and refuse or cancel registration of morally inoffensive signs?  
Applicants’ right to commercial free speech would be unduly undermined.  
Conversely, an approach that is too liberal may provoke outrage and moral 
indignation amongst members of the public who have the right not to be 
confronted with disturbing, insulting, abusive, and even threatening 
expressions.100 
Another criticism of the ban at issue is that decisions are sometimes difficult 
to reconcile and inconsistent between themselves as judges and examiners are 
human beings and might have different sensibility (also in light of changes in 
social mores) towards certain topics, including sex, coarse language, and 
violence-related messages.  Yet, I do believe that the ban should be firmly kept 
in trademark statutes as it seems to produce more benefits (in the form of a 
strong disincentive towards the use of controversial signs) than costs (i.e. risks 
of irreconcilable and inconsistent rulings). 
 
 
100. Entscheidung, [2011] HARMONISIERUNGSAMT FÜR DEN BINNENMARKT, OHIM R 
0168/201-1, para. 11 (appeal taken from Ger.); Kenneth v. J.A. Kemp & Co., [2006] OHIM R 
495/2005-G, para. 14 (appeal taken from Eng.).   
